【作者简介】刘世定，严 俊，上海大学

【文章来源】《社会学评论》2025年第6期

【内容提要】本文关注了不完全合约条件下事后调整中的底线探寻行为，采用“利益-规范”双重博弈分析框架，探讨合约参与者在有限理性条件下进行博弈的机制与策略，尤其是在利益与规范交织的情境中，行动者如何通过信号传递与策略互动实现合作收益最大化。跨文化合约参与者各自的底线并非双方的共同知识，而且通常是动态调整的。结合多个子博弈模型与实地案例，本文探讨了博弈中涉及的底线突破、差序底线、多元底线的转换等现象，揭示了跨文化博弈中的互动复杂性与策略选择的重要性。双重博弈模型对于不完全合约下的事后调整具有广泛的适用性，可为中国企业在海外复杂环境中的经营决策提供理论启示。

【关键词】不完全合约 / 底线探寻 / “利益-规范”双重博弈 / 跨文化管理

【全文链接】http://src.ruc.edu.cn/CN/Y2025/V13/I6/5

The“Interest-Norm”Dual Game of Bottom-Line Exploration in Incomplete Contracts:Reflections on the Relationship between Multinational Corporations and Cross-Cultural Environments

Abstract: This paper examines bottom-line exploration behavior during expost adjustments under incomplete contracts. Using an“interest-norm”dual game analytical framework, it investigates the mechanisms and strategies of contract participants who engage in game interactions under bounded rationality. Specifically, it explores how actors navigate scenarios where interests and norms are intertwined,leveraging signaling and strategic interactions to maximize cooperative gains. The study proposes that the respective bottom lines of cross-cultural contract participants are not common knowledge and are often subject to dynamic adjustments. Using a combination of sub-game models and field cases, the paper explores phenomena such as bottom-line breaches, differentiated bottom lines, and the transition among multiple bottom lines. It highlights the complexity of interactions and the importance of strategic choices in cross-cultural games. The research concludes that the dual game model has broad applicability to expost adjustments under incomplete contracts and offers theoretical insights for Chinese enterprises operating in complex overseas environments.