【作者简介】刘红芹，华东理工大学公共政策系讲师，主要研究方向为公共财政与政府间关系、城市发展和地方治理；耿曙（通讯作者），浙江大学文科“百人计划”研究员、公共管理学院博士生导师，主要研究方向为比较政治经济、中国地方政府行为。

【文章来源】《社会学评论》第4期

【内容提要】地方政府的行为是否经常流于短视？两大主流理论——“晋升锦标赛”与“财政联邦制”对此有着迥然不同的看法，为厘清二者分歧，本研究利用2000—2018 年的地市财政支出数据分析了地方政府的行为模式。研究发现，地方政府越能自主支配其财政资源，越会将资源投往长期发展的方向，而官员个体的政治激励对政府行为并无显著影响。机制检验显示，随着时间推移，地方政府会主动学习，持续改进其资源配置模式。此外，稳定的制度安排有利于创造可置信承诺，助力地方的可持续发展。这一发现为央地关系的良性互动提供了新的思路与规划方向。

【关键词】财政联邦，晋升锦标，短视，财政收入，财政支出

【全文链接】http://src.ruc.edu.cn/CN/Y2023/V11/I4/53

Are Local Governments Myopic? Fiscal Federalism,Promotional Tournament and Public Expenditure in China’s Prefecture-Level Governments

LIU Hong-qin, KENG Shu

Abstract：Fiscal Federalism and Promotional Tournaments are two mainstream theories that explain China’s local governments, which have very different views on the myopia problem of China’s local governments. Given the obvious discrepancy, the paper proposes a series of empirical tests based on the data of prefecture-level cities from 2000 to 2018. We find that the more autonomous the local governments on their control over fiscal resources, the more fiscal resources would flow into the sustainable growth sectors. The political incentives to official individuals, however, have no significant impact on government behaviors.Furthermore, the local governments had been learning and adjusting to improve their resource allocation. In addition, stable institutional arrangements, constituting credible commitments, would further encourage governments to pursue sustainability. Our findings thus suggest that we need to reflect on and project the positive relationship between the central and local governments in China.

Keywords:fiscal federalism，promotion tournaments，political myopia，fiscal revenues，government expenditure