【作者简介】吕冰洋，中国人民大学财政金融政策研究中心、财政金融学院；郭雨萌，北京大学第一医院

【文章来源】《社会学研究》2026年第3期

【内容提要】本文旨在超越西方财政分权理论，以“集分相制”概括中国特色政府间财政关系的制度逻辑。在“中央统一领导、地方分级管理”的制度框架下，中央政府与地方政府之间存在较为突出的信息复杂性、不确定性和不对称性等问题。为化解这些问题和实现“控制、 激励、平衡”三大治理目标，中国政府间财政关系要实行统一治理。在不同历史时期，中央政府会灵活调整政府间财政权力的划分，以匹配并实现相应的治理目标，由此演化出复杂的组织形式，并对各级政府行为、国家治理和历史发展产生深刻影响。

【关键词】政府间财政关系；集分相制；财政分权；国家治理

【项目基金】本文系国家社会科学基金重大项目“推动全国统一大市场建设的财税体制改革研究”（24&ZD065）的阶段性成果。

【全文链接】https://shxyj.ajcass.com/Magazine/show/?id=122854

Intergovernmental Checks and Balances: The Institutional Logic of China’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations

Abstract: This paper aims to transcend Western fiscal decentralization theories and conceptualizes the institutional logic of China's intergovernmental fiscal relations as “intergovernmental checks and balances. ”Within the institutional framework of “centralized unified leadership with local hierarchical management ”, there exists significant issues of information complexity, uncertainty, and asymmetry between central and local governments. The central government must simultaneously pursue three governance objectives: control, incentives, and balance. To address these challenges and achieve governance objectives, China's intergovernmental fiscal relations require unified governance. Across different historical periods, China's central government flexibly adjusts the allocation of fiscal authority between levels of government to achieve governance objectives. As a result, China's intergovernmental fiscal relations have developed into complex organizational forms, exerting profound influences on government behavior, state governance, and long-term historical development.