【作者简介】郑博文，华中科技大学社会学院暨中国乡村治理研究中心博士研究生，主要研究方向为地方政府行为；狄金华，华中科技大学社会学院暨中国乡村治理研究中心教授，主要研究方向为农村社会学、组织社会学。

【文章来源】《社会学评论》第6期

【内容提要】强激励是不是行政发包的必要条件是本文关注的核心问题。本文以农村不动产确权登记工作为例，分析当治理的紧迫性凸显时，基层政府如何通过将治理任务发包至内部再造的属地组织来保证任务的完成。研究发现，在弱激励的条件下，基层政府内部也能进行发包治理。弱激励发包制与发包制原型理论在发包方目标衡量、管理者激励设置、代理方行为选择等多个维度存在显著差异。弱激励发包制之所以有效，有赖于基层政府内部形成的政治联盟以及基层政府官员嵌入的“公”与“私”的伦理结构，受到政治伦理和社会伦理的形塑。本文不仅提炼了一个制度约束条件改变后的理论概念变体，更考虑了有着多重面向的政府官员个体，基于基层政府的发包治理实践拓展了原型理论，从激励兼容性的角度对现有理论做了推进。

【关键词】街基层政府，行政发包制，弱激励，政府官员

【全文链接】http://src.ruc.edu.cn/CN/Y2023/V11/I6/211

Low Powered Incentive Administrative Subcontract within the Grassroots Government——Case Analysis Based on the Implementation of Rural Real Estate Right Confirmation Registration

ZHENG Bo-wen，DI Jin-hua

Abstract：Whether the high powered incentive is the necessary condition of the administrative subcontract is the core issue of this paper. This paper takes the implementation of rural real estate right confirmation and registration as an example to analyze that when the urgency of governance becomes prominent，the grassroots government can ensure the completion of the task by subcontracting the governance task to the internally reconstituted territorial organization. This paper finds that，under the condition of low powered incentive，grassroots governments can also carry out subcontract governance. Significant differences exist between the low powered incentive administrative subcontract and the prototype theory in several dimensions，such as the employer’s goal measurement，the manager’s incentive setting and the agent’s behavior selection. The effectiveness of the low powered incentive administrative subcontract depends on the political alliance formed within the grassroots government and the ethical structure of“public”and“private”embedded by the grassroots government officials，shaped by political ethics and social ethics. What this paper attempts to extract is not only a variant of the theoretical concept after the change of institutional constraints，but the essence is to put forward a multi-oriented government officials’subcontract governance to form an expansion of the prototype theory in the practice of subcontract governance for grass-roots governments, and promote the existing theory from the perspective of incentive compatibility.

Keywords:grassroots government, administrative subcontract, low powered incentive, government officials